CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 19

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

2. ALTERNATIVES TO AN ANGLO-FRENCH VARIABLE GEOMETRY AIRCRAFT

(Previous Reference: OPD(66) 48th Meeting)

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that, when the Committee had last discussed

this subject on 9th December, the general concensus had been that, if the

French proved to be unwilling to proceed with a joint project, we should develop a national variable geometry (V/G) aircraft. This was essential

to provide a successor for the V bombers from 1974 onwards and to replace

the F 111 in the strike role later in the 1970s as wastage forced us to

restrict this aircraft to reconnaissance. The alternative would be to

purchase more F 11ls but this would not meet the second objective of

preserving in this country the capability of developing a combat aircraft. Because a V/G aircraft to meet our needs alone would be less complex than

an Anglo-French aircraft, its development cost would be smaller although

it would still cost us about £30 million more in development than a half

share in a joint project. The fact that the French had become aware that

we would be likely to carry out a national project if they did not

co-operate with us had almost certainly played a part in disposing them

to do so. The aircraft that we would produce ourselves would not have the

capability of interception that they needed and they could not therefore

wait and purchase them from us if they were a success. In any event they had an industrial problem similar to ours. We ought therefore to decide that we would if necessary proceed with a national V/G aircraft, both so that this could be used to put pressure on the French to reach an acceptable

agreement with us and so that, if negotiations broke down, an announcement of our alternative plans could be made quickly. Although a complete

breakdown in negotiations seened unlikely we should nevertheless be

prepared for it.

In discussion doubts were expressed at the wisdom of deciding now

to proceed with a national project if negotiations with the French broke

down. A new situation would exist which should be considered on its merits,

particularly as it would be a reversal of the policy recently agreed by the Government for this country again to embark on a major military

aircraft project alone. Nor would the aircraft envisaged in that event

be sufficiently advanced to enable our technological capacity and

experience in design in the aircraft industry to be adequately developed.

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